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 Non-technical summary 
Although the public enforcement of anti-cartel laws in the European Union has recently 
attracted a substantial amount of economic research, several important and policy-relevant 
research questions remain unanswered. One particularly interesting area in this respect is 
empirical studies on the investigation procedures of the European Commission (EC) in 
general and the determinants of the duration of investigations in particular. A deeper 
knowledge of these determinants would not only allow conclusions on how authority 
procedures could be improved but would also help the involved firms to optimize their 
resource inputs during antitrust investigations. 
 Against this background, we present an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement 
decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following a general characterization of EC cartel 
enforcement activities by essentially interpreting basic descriptive statistics as well as selected 
time series, we empirically investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations 
by the EC. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the 
Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or 
the existence of a chief witness. Additionally, our analysis also reveals that both the number 
of cartel members and the number of national countries involved in the cartel did not have a 
significant effect on investigation length. The same conclusion is true for the number of 
detected cartels in the previous business year(s) and the existence of a repeated offender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Trotz der in der jüngeren Vergangenheit festzustellenden verstärkten ökonomischen 
Forschung im Bereich der öffentlich-rechtlichen Kartellverfolgung sind einige wichtige und 
politikrelevante Forschungsfragen bislang unbeantwortet geblieben. Ein in diesem 
Zusammenhang besonders interessantes Themenfeld stellen Studien zu den entsprechenden 
behördlichen Untersuchungen im Allgemeinen und den Determinanten der Länge solcher 
Untersuchungen im Besonderen dar. Tiefgreifende Erkenntnisse zu solchen Determinanten 
würden nicht nur Schlussfolgerungen darüber erlauben, wie die entsprechenden Prozesse in 
den Behörden verbessert werden können, sondern würden ebenso den verfahrensbeteiligten 
Unternehmen bei ihrer Ressourcenplanung und -optimierung helfen.  
Vor diesem Hintergrund führen wir eine empirische Untersuchung der Kartellentscheidungen 
der Europäischen Kommission (EK) von 2000 bis 2011 durch. Im Anschluss an eine generelle 
Beschreibung der entsprechenden Kommissionsaktivitäten durch eine Auswertung genereller 
deskriptiver Statistiken sowie ausgewählter Zeitreihen, untersuchen wir die Determinanten 
der Dauer der Entscheidungsfindung der EK. Wir sind dadurch in der Lage, einige zentrale 
Faktoren der Untersuchungslänge zu identifizieren, wie insbesondere die Geschwindigkeit der 
EK bei der Aufdeckung der Kartelle, dem Typ der Kartellabsprache, der Art der betroffenen 
Industrie sowie der Verfügbarkeit eines Kronzeugen. Zusätzlich führt unsere Studie auch zu 
Tage, dass weder die Anzahl der am Kartell beteiligten Unternehmen noch die Anzahl der am 
Kartell beteiligten Nationen einen signifikanten Effekt auf die Untersuchungslänge hat. Die 
gleiche Schlussfolgerung gilt auch für die Anzahl der in den Vorjahren aufgedeckten Kartelle 
sowie für das Vorliegen eines Wiederholungstäters.    
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Abstract 
We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 
2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the 
determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key 
drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of 
cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness. 
Keywords 
Competition Policy; Empirical Analysis; Cartels; European Union; Fines; Leniency; Duration 
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1. Introduction 
The public enforcement of anti-cartel laws in the European Union has recently attracted a 
substantial amount of economic research. In addition to assessments of the question whether 
current fine levels are coming close to the theoretically optimal fines2, the 2006 reform of the 
EU penalty guidelines led to several studies investigating the effects of the reform as well as – 
more generally – the determinants of cartel-related fines.3  
 Although existing cartel-related research generated interesting and policy-relevant insights 
on the efficiency of the current enforcement regime, several research questions remain 
unanswered. One particularly interesting area in this respect is empirical studies on the 
investigation procedures of the European Commission in general and the determinants of the 
                                                            
1  ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Competition and Regulation Research Group; MaCCI 
Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation; Address: L7,1, 68161 Mannheim, Germany; E-mail: 
hueschelrath@zew.de; Internet: www.zew.de. We are thankful to Bastian Sattelberger and Anne Zirngiebl 
for excellent research assistance.  
2  See, e.g., C. Veljanovski, Cartel Fines in Europe: Law, Practice and Deterrence, World Competition 30, 65-
86, 2007, and F. Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law, ZEW 
Discussion Paper 12-050, 2012, Mannheim. 
3  See, e.g., C. Veljanovski, Deterrence, Recidivism, and European Cartel Fines, Journal of Competition Law & 
Economics 7, 871-915, 2011, and J. Connor and D. Miller, Determinants of EC Antitrust Fines for Members 
of Global Cartels, Purdue University Working Paper, 2009, West Lafayette.  
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duration of investigations in particular.4 A deeper knowledge of these determinants would not 
only allow conclusions on how authority procedures could be improved but would also help 
the involved firms to optimize their resource inputs during antitrust investigations.     
 Against this background, we present an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement 
decisions between 2000 and 2011. We start off in Section 2 with a general characterization of 
EC cartel enforcement activities by essentially interpreting basic descriptive statistics as well 
as selected time series such as the number of decided cases or the overall amount of fines 
imposed by the European Commission in the respective years. Subsequently, in Section 3, we 
concentrate on one particular empirical aspect which has not been investigated intensively so 
far: the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations by the EC. Section 4 concludes 
the article with a summary of the basic insights and a delineation of future research avenues.   
2. General characterization of EC cartel enforcement between 2000 and 2011  
In this section, we present several basic empirical insights on cartel enforcement by the EC 
between 2000 and 2011. In particular, we describe the dataset and the corresponding 
descriptive statistics in Section 2.1, followed by a discussion of time series of selected 
enforcement characteristics in Section 2.2.  
2.1 Dataset and descriptive statistics 
The dataset applied in this article contains information on all cartel cases decided by the 
European Commission between 2000 and 2011. The data were collected from decisions and 
press releases published by the EC in the course of its investigations and combine case-
specific as well as firm-specific information. On the case level, information such as cartel 
type, cartel duration, number of cartel members, affected industry, relevant geographic 
market(s) and imposed overall fines are available. Regarding firm-specific data, we include 
information on the individual length of cartel participation, the level of fines imposed by the 
EC, whether the firm applied for leniency or not and the value of fine reductions following a 
successful leniency application. Furthermore, specific factors that are relevant for the 
calculation of the fine such as, e.g., aggravating and mitigating circumstances or repeated 
                                                            
4  We are only aware of one recent study which investigates the determinants of the duration of antitrust 
investigations. See A. Massadeh, An Empirical Assessment of the European Commission Enforcement of 
Competition Law, University of East Anglia Working Paper, 2011, Norwich. 
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offenders are included. In sum, the data set combines information on 73 EC cartel cases and 
471 cartel members.5 Table 1 displays an excerpt of the descriptive statistics of the data set.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Number of firms 6.45 5 3.90 2 17 
Cartel duration (total, in months) 105.73 72 84.75 5 408 
Cartel duration (firm specific, in months) 93.66 68 69.23 4 408 
Total fine per case (m €) 228.04 109.90 283.95 0.45 1383.90 
Individual fine per firm (m €) 35.39 10.64 78.87 0 896 
Fine reduction per firm  0.21 0.01 0.31 0 1 
Share of leniency cases  0.88. 1 0.33 0 1 
Leniency collaboration rate per case 0.51 0.50 0.33 0 1 
 
As shown in Table 1, the average number of cartel firms is 6.45 and the average overall cartel 
duration is 106 months (8.81 years). The median values of both factors are 5 firms and 72 
months (6 years), respectively. The average firm-specific length of cartel participation is 94 
months (7.81 years), which is close to the overall cartel duration and suggests that cartels are 
generally stable in terms of membership losses during cartelization. Interestingly, plotting 
cartel duration against the number of firms reveals a positive relationship, i.e., cartel duration 
increases with the number of firms in the cartel.6  
 Regarding cartel fines, the average fine per case imposed by the European Commission 
between 2000 and 2011 amounts to 228 million €. It varies between 450,000 € imposed in the 
Luxembourg brewer case and 1.38 billion € in the Carglass cartel. 88 percent of the cases 
show leniency applications and, on average, 51 percent of the firms in each case applied for 
fine reductions as part of the program. The average fine reduction per firm – which is not 
necessarily due to a leniency application but could also relate to, e.g., the inability to pay 
larger fines – is 21 percent of the initial base fine imposed. 
 
 
                                                            
5  It is worth noting that one cartel member is not necessarily represented by one single firm in our dataset. In 
cases in which several firms are jointly liable for the infringement, this ‘group of companies’ is treated as one 
observation. 
6  On the surface, this finding contradicts with the basic theoretical industrial organisation literature which 
suggests that the larger the number of cartel members, the more difficult it is to reach consensus on an 
agreement (and its subsequent monitoring). However, case-study related evidence suggests that particular 
types of cartel agreements (such as especially market division agreements) are workable with even larger 
numbers of cartel members. Furthermore, as soon as industry associations or comparable organisations 
support their members in their coordination activities (e.g., by providing detailed industry-specific datasets), 
larger numbers of cartel members can be organised effectively. 
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2.2 Discussion of selected enforcement characteristics over time  
In addition to the presentation of the descriptive statistics in the preceding section, a 
discussion of selected enforcement characteristics over time can create further insights on 
cartel enforcement in the European Union.  
2.2.1 Number of decided cases and the role of leniency 
The usual starting point of studies on cartel enforcement is a basic analysis of the number of 
decided cases over time. Figure 1 therefore illustrates the number of cases decided by the 
European Commission between 2000 and 2011. 
 
Figure 1: Number of cases and the role of leniency (2000-2011) 
As revealed by Figure 1, the number of decided cases varies between a minimum of only 3 
cases in 2000 and a maximum of 10 cases in the subsequent year 2001. In most years, 
between five and eight cases were decided by the Commission. It is further shown in Figure 1 
that the number of leniency cases has increased substantially in recent years. While none of 
the 3 cases decided in 2000 involved any leniency application, all cases decided by the 
Commission over the last two years show at least one leniency application by a cartel 
member.   
 Although not displayed in Figure 1, our database allows a further characterization of the 
decided EC cartel cases. With respect to the affected industries, about 75 percent of all cartels 
in our database refer to the manufacturing industry while the remaining 25 percent largely 
belong to either wholesale trade or transporting and storage. Within the group of 
manufacturing, roughly 40 percent of the cartel cases referred to the sub-category ‘chemicals 
and chemical products’. Turning to the types of agreements, 60 cartel decisions by the 
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Commission referred to ‘information exchange’ as cartel type, followed by ‘market division’ 
in 38 cases, ‘quantity fixing’ in 20 cases and ‘price fixing’ in 19 cases.7 Interestingly, ‘bid-
rigging’ only played a minor role and was mentioned as type of collusion in only 3 decided 
cases.  
2.2.2 Sum of fines and average fines per firm 
Complementary to an analysis of the number of cartel cases, an analysis of the sum of fines 
imposed together with the average fine per firm can add value. Figure 2 below displays the 
respective time series.  
 
 
Figure 2: Sum of fines and average fines per firm (2000-2011) 
As shown in Figure 2, the sum of fines fluctuates substantially in the period under 
investigation. While the year 2000 shows the smallest amount of fines of in sum €149.46 
million, the largest amount (€3294.30 million) was reached in 2007. As already mentioned in 
Section 2.1 above, the sum of fines is often driven by one or a few very large cartels (in terms 
of revenue) and consequently very large fines. 
 In addition to the sum of fines imposed by the EC in the respective years, Figure 2 also 
displays the average fine per firm on a yearly basis. It is revealed that the average fine stayed 
at a relatively low level until 2004, however, experienced a substantial increase in subsequent 
years. Interestingly, the years 2010 and 2011 show a remarkable drop in the average fine 
(compared to its all-time high in 2009). One reason for this development could be seen in 
larger fine reductions granted by the EC.     
                                                            
7  It is important to mention here that many cartel cases involved more than one type of collusion.  
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2.2.3 Share of leniency applicants and average fine reductions  
As already shown in Section 2.2.1 the share of leniency cases increased substantially in the 
EU from 2000 to 2011. As leniency programs do not only offer fine exemptions or reductions 
for the first firm which discloses its participation in a cartel but also aims at incentivizing 
other cartel members to come forward and cooperate with the Commission, an interesting 
question is how the share of leniency applicants other than the chief witness changed over 
time. Figure 3 below presents the respective time series.     
 
 
Figure 3: Average reduction of cartel fines for firms (2000-2011) 
As shown in Figure 3, following a very small share of leniency applicants in the year 2000, 
a substantial increase was observed from 2001 to 2003 reaching values of above 60 percent. 
Interestingly, the following years experienced a constant decrease of the respective share to a 
minimum of less than 20 percent in 2007. In recent years, the share of leniency applicants in 
the respective cases increased again reaching a value of almost 60 percent in 2011. Although 
it is generally difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions on these isolated empirical 
observations, one possible explanation for the observed time trend could be seen in an 
increase in transparency on how the leniency program is applied together with first observable 
experiences that fine levels are reduced significantly in case a cartel member decides to fully 
cooperate with the Commission.   
In addition to the share of leniency applicants, Figure 3 also shows the average percentage 
reduction for firms collaborating with the competition authority under the leniency program. 
As revealed by the time series, the average reduction fluctuates between 10 percent and 30 
percent with the year 2000 showing the lowest value (of about 10 percent) and the year 2002 
showing the highest value (of about 33 percent).  
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3. Determinants of the duration of cartel investigations by the European Commission 
In this section, we complement our general characterization of the enforcement of anti-cartel 
laws by the European Commission with an empirical investigation of one particular 
procedural aspect: the length of investigations by the Commission. In addition to a descriptive 
analysis of different enforcement periods and a collection of potential determinants of the 
duration of investigations, we particularly conduct an econometric analysis to investigate the 
key determinants of investigation length.   
 In general, several arguments suggest that an analysis of the length of the investigation in 
general and the determinants of this length in particular can add value. First, from the 
perspective of the affected firms, a longer investigation period increases legal uncertainty in 
the sense that firms do not know for sure whether their behavior is classified as hardcore 
cartel and what fine they eventually will have to pay. Furthermore, longer investigation 
periods are typically connected with larger resource inputs that need to be allocated to both in-
house and external activities (in the form of advice by lawyers and/or economists).    
 Second, from the perspective of the responsible authority, the length of the investigation 
could be interpreted as a measure of administrative efficiency in the sense that the quicker a 
decision is reached (with a fixed number of staff), the more efficient are the internal 
procedures of the authority.8 Furthermore, additional knowledge on the determinants of the 
duration of investigations can point towards possible procedural improvement potential.  
 Last but not least, the length of the investigations has implications for further stakeholders. 
For example, the longer the respective investigation period, the longer tax payers have to wait 
to profit from the collected fine payments. Furthermore, longer investigation periods delay 
possible private enforcement activities (as long as these are planned as follow-on suits)9 and 
therefore weaken the deterrent effect of antitrust laws generally. 
3.1 Descriptive analysis of enforcement periods 
In formal investigations of competition policy cases in general and cartel cases in particular, 
several enforcement periods can be differentiated. First, there is the time span between the 
end of the cartel and the beginning of the investigation. Generally, one would expect that the 
usual procedure is that the competition authority detects a cartel and starts an investigation 
                                                            
8  However, it is important to mention at this point that a trade-off between the quickness of the decision and its 
accuracy can be assumed, i.e., an economic solution has to find an optimal investigation length (which 
typically is not the minimum investigation length). 
9  Although interest payments may compensate for the longer waiting time, there might be occasions in which 
harmed customers go bankrupt before they are awarded with the respective damages. 
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shortly afterwards. As shown in Figure 4, this expectation is only met in several years of the 
investigation period.   
 
Figure 4: Time span between cartel end and beginning of investigation (2000-2011) 
Although several years show the expected short period from the end of the cartel to the 
beginning of the investigation, especially the last few years in the dataset experience a 
substantial increase in the average time span. One explanation for this development could be 
seen in an increase in cartels that were reported by involved firms long after they were 
actually terminated. Such behavior could, e.g., be rational when a newly installed 
management would like to start off with a clean record and therefore decides to report old 
infringements of competition law. The possibility of applying for leniency motivates such a 
behavior further. In a sense, the time series could reflect an increase in the ‘passive’ detection 
of cartels through the leniency program and a corresponding decrease in the ‘active’ cartel 
detection activities (or successes) of the Commission.10 
 A second enforcement period of potential interest is the time span between the beginning 
of the investigation and the decision by the competition authority. Figure 5 shows the 
respective development for the EC for the period from 2000 to 2011.  
                                                            
10  The negative values in 2000, 2001 and 2007 indicate that in some cases, investigations already started before 
the actual cartel breakdown. This might be due to the fact that either the EC already attracted attention in 
such cases or the chief witness in the course of the leniency program collected further evidence in 
coordination with the EC while the cartels were still active. Furthermore, there might be cases in which it was 
legally unclear whether the identified firm collaboration actually was an infringement of competition law and 
the firms therefore decided to continue their cooperation after the investigation has been opened. 
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Figure 5: Time span between beginning of investigation and decision (2000-2011) 
As shown in Figure 5, the time span between the beginning of the investigation and the 
decision fluctuates from on average 93.3 months (about 7.7 years) in the year 200011 to 32.8 
months (about 2.7 years) in the year 2003. On average, a cartel investigation lasted about 50.8 
months (about 4.2 years) for the entire period from 2000 to 2011 and 46.6 months if the 
(exceptional) year 2000 is excluded from the analysis.   
 In addition to the two enforcement periods discussed so far, further periods could be 
identified. For example, the time span between the decision of the Commission and a first 
court decision could be analyzed. Another option would be to investigate the full time span 
from the beginning of the investigation until a final decision is reached. Without wanting to 
disregard the relevance of a detailed analysis of all these different time periods, the following 
section concentrates on an empirical analysis of the determinants of especially one time 
period: from the beginning of the investigation until the competition authority reaches a final 
decision on the respective cartel case.  
3.2 Potential determinants of the duration of investigations  
Before we turn to our empirical analysis, it is necessary to generally think about potential 
determinants of the duration of investigations. First, it can be expected that the duration 
increases with the length of the cartel. Ceteris paribus, a cartel that only lasted a year should 
be easier to investigate than a cartel with a length of ten years (possibly including several 
price wars etc.). Second, we expect a positive relationship between the time from the end of 
                                                            
11  The long time span in the year 2000 is largely driven by one cartel case with an exceptionally long 
investigation length. 
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the cartel until the beginning of the investigation and the duration of the investigation, 
basically because the shorter the respective period, the easier is information gathering for the 
authority.  
 Third, it can be expected that the number of cartel members and the number of national 
countries involved in the cartel, ceteris paribus, increase investigation length as complexity on 
the side of the authority is increased substantially. Fourth, both the type of the cartelized 
product and the type of the cartel agreement might influence the duration of the investigation. 
Ceteris paribus, it can be expected that the more homogenous the product, the easier it is for 
the authority to investigate and the simpler the cartel agreement, the easier (and quicker) it is 
for the authority to collect sufficient evidence.  
 Fifth, it can be expected that the duration of the investigation increases with the number of 
detected cartels in the previous year(s), basically because the fixed staff of the authority gets 
busier. Sixth, it can be expected that the existence of a chief witness makes it easier for the 
authority to collect sufficient evidence and should therefore speed up the investigation. The 
same argument holds for the degree of cooperation among further cartel members. The larger 
this share, the easier (and quicker) the investigation by the authority. 
 Seventh, cases of repeated offenders might allow the authority to increase investigation 
speed as they already gained substantial knowledge of the respective industry in preceding 
investigation(s). Eighth, on a more general level, it could be expected that the authorities’ 
staff realize general learning economies in processing cases over time causing a general 
downward trend in average duration of the investigation.  
3.3 Empirical analysis and results 
In order to find out which factors actually determine the duration of EC cartel investigations, 
we conduct an econometric analysis. Based on our data set of 73 decided EC cartel cases from 
2000 to 2011, we apply a multivariate regression approach with the time span between the 
beginning of the investigation and the decision (‘duration of investigation’) as dependent 
variable. The independent variables are subdivided in five categories (largely referring to our 
general assessment in the previous section): Cartel duration and detection; type of cartel; 
cooperation with Commission; industry and time trend. Table 2 presents the key results of the 
regression analysis. 
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Table 2: Regression results 
Variables Coefficient  S.E. 
Cartel Duration and Detection    
Duration of the cartel 0.0416  (0.0290) 
Period until detection  -0.303 *** (0.0701) 
Cartel detected before terminated 20.22 *** (7.400) 
Type of Cartel    
Market division -13.94 * (7.589) 
Price and quantity fixing -26.01 *** (9.499) 
Price fixing and market division -11.58 * (6.657) 
All three simultaneously -14.25 * (7.778) 
Cooperation with Commission    
Chief witness -9.717 * (5.357) 
Average reduction due to leniency 4.807  (20.04) 
Industry    
Beverages 13.03  (10.01) 
Transportation 5.965  (12.50) 
Wholesale Trade 7.273  (11.04) 
Manufacturing 19.17 ** (8.709) 
Time trend 1.418 * (0.826) 
Constant 35.76 *** (8.130) 
Observations 73   
R2 0.425   
Adjusted R2 0.286   
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 As shown in Table 2, our estimation explains 42.5% of the variation in the length of the 
investigation. In the cartel duration and detection category, cartel duration is found to affect 
the duration of the decision positively, however, the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. Furthermore, we find that the larger the period between the end of the cartel and 
the beginning of the investigation, the quicker the respective decision by the Commission. 
Although surprising at first sight, several possible explanation are conceivable. First, such 
cartels are usually reported by cartel firms (and not detected by the authority) and, 
consequently, these firms have strong incentives to provide the necessary proofs right away 
thereby speeding up the investigation. Second, as these cartel cases are older, a smaller 
amount of evidence is available (that needs to be investigated before a decision is made). 
With respect to the third variable – Cartel detected before terminated – we find that 
processing such cases take on average about 20 month longer. Generally, a cartel can be 
detected before it ends for two reasons. First, there might be cases in which it was legally 
unclear whether the identified firm collaboration actually was an infringement of competition 
law (and the firms decided to continue their cooperation after the investigation has been 
opened). Second, in leniency cases, the Commission might have been forced to wait for more 
evidence before it was able to extend the investigation to further cartel members.  
 Turning to the type of cartel category, we differentiate between four groups: ‘Market 
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division’, ‘price and quantity fixing’, ‘price fixing and market division’ and ‘all three 
simultaneously’.12 Our reference group is all cartel cases in which only prices were fixed. For 
any other type of cartel which involves quantity fixing and/or market division we observe that 
on average the decision takes significantly less time (as indicated by the negative coefficients 
shown in Table 2). For instance, for the combination of price and quantity fixing, 
investigation length is 26 months shorter compared to a case which only involved price fixing. 
There are several reasons which can explain this finding. First, quantity fixing is usually done 
in industries in which firms have to plan production capacities. In such an environment, a 
cartel agreement often demands a detailed documentation which eases the investigation once 
the cartel is discovered. Second, cases in which territories or customers are divided between 
the colluding parties are easy to prove by the Commission as soon as, e.g., customers are 
found who experienced refusals to deal in a certain territory.  
 The cooperation with Commission category refers to the role of leniency programs. 
Leniency rules were introduced to destabilize existing cartels through an increase in the 
probability of detection. In our regression analysis reported in Table 2 above, we find that in 
cases with a chief witness, it took the Commission on average 9.71 months less to finalize a 
decision. This is understandable as a chief witness is providing hard evidence that can directly 
be used to build up the specific case. Furthermore, the EC leniency program also contains the 
possibility of fine reductions for other cartel members as soon as they decide to fully 
cooperate with the Commission. Instead of including the share of collaborators we controlled 
for the average reduction for subsequently collaborating cartel firms as a measure for the 
effectiveness of the collaboration. We find that more collaboration has a positive (but 
insignificant) effect on duration length suggesting that the respective increase in the workload 
on the side of the Commission (due to the additional evidence handed in) delays the 
respective decisions. 
 Furthermore, we introduce the industry category to control for possible industry 
differences. As our dataset is relatively small, we deviate from the classical standard industrial 
classification and defined four broader industry groups – Beverages, Transportation, 
Wholesale Trade and Manufacturing - and used the remaining cases as reference category. As 
shown in Table 2, compared to all other industries, cartel investigations in the manufacturing 
sector took more than one and a half years longer than other investigations. This finding can 
be explained by the typically complex markets and products in this sector and the 
consequently larger amount of time needed to fully investigate the alleged cartel agreements. 
                                                            
12  We also did not control for bid-rigging cases as we have only three observations in the dataset. 
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For the other three industry groups we also find positive, but smaller and insignificant effects.  
 Last but not least, we have included a time trend variable in our estimation. Our results 
reveal a positive and significant development over time. This suggests that, since the 
beginning of our dataset in 2000, the Commission needed almost one and a half months 
longer every year to reach a decision in the respective cartel cases.  
 In addition to the variables reported in Table 2, we tested several specifications with 
different selections of (further) variables. Referring to our discussion of potential 
determinants of the duration of investigations in Section 3.2, it turned out that the number of 
cartel members and the number of national countries involved in the cartel did not have a 
significant effect on investigation length. The same conclusion is true for the number of 
detected cartels in the previous business year(s) and the existence of a repeated offender. Due 
to the restricted number of observations and the remaining degrees of freedom we abstracted 
from including these variables. 
4. Summary and conclusion 
In this article, we presented an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions 
between 2000 and 2011. We started off in Section 2 with a general characterization of EC 
cartel enforcement activities by essentially interpreting basic descriptive statistics as well as 
selected time series such as the number of decided cases or the overall amount of fines 
imposed by the European Commission in the respective years. Subsequently, in Section 3, we 
concentrated on one particular empirical aspect which has not been investigated intensively so 
far: the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations by the EC. Our empirical analysis 
was able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s 
speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of 
a chief witness. 
 Given these key results of our analysis, what can be concluded with respect to policy 
recommendations? On the surface, our results suggest that – in order to speed up the 
investigation procedure – the Commission is well advised to focus on the factors which were 
identified as drivers of a longer investigation period. Consequently, it could be concluded that 
the Commission should improve their analytical skills with respect to pure price agreements, 
should further promote the leniency program or should extend their knowledge in 
manufacturing industries to speed up the respective investigations.   
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 Although our results would in principle support such conclusions, they mask important 
shortcomings of the analysis. Most importantly, we usually have to expect a trade-off between 
the speed of the investigation and the accuracy of the decision. Although cartel cases are 
relatively easy to detect and handle compared to other infringements of competition law, a 
detailed analysis by the Commission is still needed to build a strong case that stands in 
subsequent court investigations. As a consequence, the derivation of an optimal investigation 
speed clearly is a non-trivial exercise and our analysis does not allow any conclusion on 
whether this optimal level is achieved by the current enforcement practice. Furthermore, the 
speed of an investigation by a competition authority surely depends on many unobservable 
factors. For example, it is unclear to what extent an increase in the number of staff of the 
competition authority is able to speed up the investigation procedure. If general case worker 
capacities are the bottleneck, such a step would surely help. However, if a large part of the 
investigation consists of waiting time for the respective firms to respond to information 
requests, additional staff cannot be expected to further increase the speed of investigation.   
 Our empirical results together with the identified shortcomings immediately suggest 
several avenues for future research. One interesting area in this respect is field studies in 
competition authorities to learn more on the real bottlenecks in their every day investigation 
work. Such studies are likely to allow the inclusion of further variables (possibly) reaching an 
even better explanatory value of an empirical analysis. Another fruitful area of future research 
is international comparisons of the investigation lengths and their determinants. Although it is 
obvious that legislative differences across countries will complicate such an endeavor, 
benchmarking exercises would still enable efficiency comparisons and would therefore allow 
basing policy conclusions on more robust foundations. 
 
